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The Theory of the Tentative Trust
The foundation of the tentative trust is a deposit of funds by A "in
trust for B". It was not new when the New York Court enunciated the
tentative trust doctrine.' Such deposits "in trust", however, caused much
difficulty because of the uncertainty as to whether the depositor on making
the deposit in this form intended to make a gift of the money or had no
intention at all of divesting himself of ownership.2 If that doubt were
resolved in favor of the "in trust" deposit being a genuine trust disposition,
further confusion resulted by virtue of the fact that such a trust was con-
sidered "irrevocable" in spite of the prevalent practice of the depositor to
use it as his own until his demise.3 Since originally, then, a transaction
such as this was accorded the status of an immediate legal trust,4 the estate
of the depositor would be liable for any withdrawals after its creation.
Because of these factors, the New York law was in a rather confused
state. Nevertheless, the dominant purpose behind this form of deposit
was recognized-that is, "to avoid the trouble of making a will"; 5 the
practice was prevalent, and because it was a convenient method of dispos-
ing of small sums with little chance of fraud,6 the New York court was
disposed to reconcile the existing decisions and approve the practice. In
doing so its problem was to prevent the estate from being surcharged for
subsequent withdrawals made by the depositor during his lifetime, but
still to consider the arrangement as a trust in order to effectuate the
genuine dispositive intent of the depositor, i. e., to cause the balance of the
deposit to go to the named beneficiary upon the depositor's death. To
accomplish these purposes the court evolved the doctrine of the "tentative
trust" from out of the jumble of its former decisions. The language it
chose to use is the now famous and oft-quoted paragraph of Matter of
Totten: 7
"A deposit by one person of his own money, in his own name as
trustee for another, standing alone, does not establish an irrevocable
trust during the lifetime of the depositor. It is a tentative trust
merely, revocable at will, until the depositor dies or completes the
gift in his lifetime by some unequivocal act or declaration, such as
delivery of the pass book or notice to the beneficiary. In case the
depositor dies before the beneficiary without revocation, or some de-
cisive act or declaration of disaffirmance, the presumption arises that
an absolute trust was created as to the balance on hand at the death
of the depositor." 8
Since the "Totten trust" was evolved from the strict legal trust, a
mere departure for convenience, the court "guided by the principles estab-
lished by our former decisions" 9 announced the rule that it should be
x. i BoGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (1935) §47; Matter of Wein-
berg, 162 Misc. 867, 296 N. Y. Supp. 7 (Surr. Ct. 1937).
2. Beaver v. Beaver, 117 N. Y. 421, 430, 431, 22 N. E. 94o, 942 (1889).
3. Note (1933) 8 Tmip. L. Q. go.
4. Martin v. Funk, 75 N. Y. 134 (1878).
5. Matter of Totten, 179 N. Y. 112, 124, 71 N. E. 748, 752 (1904).
6. Scott, Trusts and the Statute of Wills (930) 43 HARv. L. REv. 521, 542.
7. 179 N. Y. 1H2, 71 N. E. 748 (29o4).
8. Id. at 225, 71 N. E. at 752.
9. Ibid.
(847)
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expressed in terms of the concept from which it grew, modified to obtain
the desired result. However natural the reason, the use of such language
as "tentative", "trust" and "irrevocable" has been regarded as unfortunate
by Professor Bogert.'0 It gives rise to speculation, never intended, as to
the theory of the tentative trust. That is to say, since it is labeled a
"trust", though tentative and revocable, is it to have all the incidents, not
expressly excluded by the statement of the rule itself, of the ordinary
common law trust? Or, is it sui generis, no more than an attempt to solve
a particular problem by the use of familiar language with no intent that
the entire connotation of the phrases used is to follow?
The problem immediately arises as to the moment of the creation of
this legal relationship termed a tentative trust. To those who contend
that the relationship created is essentially a trust, the time of its inception
must perforce be the moment the deposit is made or the moment of the
last deposit or withdrawal, for they are the only instances at which the
depositor evinces any intent upon which a trust can be based.' There is
authority to the effect that this is the doctrine of the tentative trust as
laid down by the New York courts-that a trust is created at the time of
the deposit, establishing rights in the named beneficiary subject to a power
of revocation.' 2  On the other side there are those who consider the
tentative trust to be sui generis, a mere fiction to obtain a desirable result,
and they would stringently limit the trust analogy. Naturally, to them
the fiction is not to be indulged in until necessary, i. e., until the death of
the depositor. They suggest that no trust is created until then, that no
change of legal status is effected by making the deposit "in trust for" dur-
ing the life of the depositor.'8 Under this tentative trust theory "the
beneficiary's rights remain inchoate, until the depositor dies without hav-
ing disturbed the declaration." 14 Succinctly stated, the conflict is as to
whether the "trust" is initiated at the time of the deposit and is subject
to a condition subsequent of revocation or whether the depositor's death
is a condition precedent to its creation.' 5
Since New York is the home of the tentative trust, and the source of
most of the litigation concerning it, a review of the cases there decided is
probably the best approach to uncover the theory behind the concept. In
the main, the New York cases in spite of their profusion consist of reitera-
tions of the basic principles of the tentative trust and most are content to
cite or quote the Totten case for this purpose.' Some seek to clarify this
io. Bogert, The Creation of Trusts by Means of Bank Deposits (I916) 1 CORN. L
Q. 159, 171, n. 86. See also Note (1919) 4 MINN. L. REv. 56, 61.
ii. Matter of Weinberg, 162 Misc. 867, 872, 296 N. Y. Supp. 7, 15 (Surr. Ct.
1937) ; it re Mines, 3I Pa. D. & C. 153, 157 (1937).
12. Scott, loc. cit. supra. note 6. It should be noted that the Totten language says
"created", but does not indicate when.
13. Bogert, loc. cit. supra note io; Slater, Joint Accounts and Trusts Created by
Bank Deposits (1933) 2 BROOKLYN L. REv. 27, 36; Notes (1934) 39 DICK. L. REv.
37, 38, (1919) 4 MINN. L. REV. 56, 59, 6I, (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 1133, 1137.
14. Note (1934) 39 Dicic. L. REV. 37, 4o.
15. Scott, supra note 6, at 543.
16. For instance: Matter of Slobiansky, 152 Misc. 232, 273 N. Y. Supp. 869 (Surr.
Ct. 1934) (beneficiary cannot recover withdrawn sums); Tierney v. Fitzpatrick, 122
App. Div. 623, 107 N. Y. Supp. 527 (Ist Dep't, 19o7); Matthews v. Brooklyn
Savings Bank, 2o8 N. Y. 508, 1o2 N. E. 520 (1913) (the trust is revocable by the
depositor) ; Thomas v. Newburgh Savings Bank, 73 Misc. 308, 13o N. Y. Supp. 8io
(1911) (the deposit may be disposed of by will) ; Davlin v. Little Guarantee and Trust
Co., 229 App. Div. 269, 241 N. Y. Supp. 712 (ist Dep't, 1930) (the trust may be made
irrevocable) ; Matter of Vaughan, 145 Misc. 332, 26o N. Y. Supp. 197 (Surr. Ct. 1932)
(sufficiency of the evidence of revocation). This last case also states that the "un-
equivocal act or declaration" necessary to make the trust irrevocable gives rise to sub-
stantially all of the litigation on Totten Trusts. Id. at 335, 26o N. Y. Supp. at 201.
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broad statement of principle with explanatory phrases of their own. And
the idea then conveyed is that the tentative trust is not a completed inter
vivos transaction subject to destruction at the will of the depositor, but
is an incipient relationship only, suggested or proposed, which is not com-
pleted or consummated until the death of the depositor.1 7  However, both
the cases which merely cite the Totten case and those which seek further
to expound the language of that case are not very useful on the theoretical
aspect. In all of these cases the dissention occurred between the bene-
ficiary and the depositor's estate after the latter's death, the problem being
either what was the depositor's intention as to the "in trust" deposit or
whether an admittedly tentative trust account had been revoked. And in
these situations an acceptance of either the completed inter vivos theory
or the mere inchoate relationship theory of the tentative trust would have
produced the desired result of getting the proceeds to the beneficiary.
Consequently, no matter how pertinent the language seems, its force is
dissipated when the situation in which it is uttered is considered.
However, there are, fortunately for the theorist, cases where the
language used is -reflected in and necessary to the final disposition of the
case. In some of these, too, the ultimate issue is the same as in the first-
considered cases-that is, whether the beneficiary or the estate takes; but
the factual situation enhances their value here. In Matter of United States
Trust Company,"8 a case arising soon after the Totten case, the issue as to
the time of the creation of the trust was the focal point of the decision.
The beneficiary had predeceased his father, the depositor, who after the
former's death did nothing about the account. Upon the father's death
the son's widow claimed the account. Her claim was denied, the court
saying: "It will be seen upon a careful reading (of the Totten case) that
the trust is, in the first place, described as a 'tentative trust', by which we
understand a suggested or proposed trust, not completed or consummated.
. . . It would seem to follow that until the depositor's death the funds
on deposit are impressed with no trust in the sense that any title thereto,
actual or beneficial, rests in the proposed beneficiary unless the depositor
shall have completed the gift. . . . As to him the tentative trust remains
inchoate and incomplete." 19 Further, ". . . upon the death of the pro-
posed beneficiary before the depositor the tentative trust terminated ipso
facto, . . . and . . . no action was necessary on the part of the de-
positor to terminate the trust." 20 The dissent 21 was based on the ground
that the deposit created a valid trust, though revocable, which remains
such until revoked by the depositor. Absent any revocation the validly
created trust continues, as in the case of any other revocable trust, until
defeated by the depositor.
What was established here remains today an undisputed incident of
the tentative trust. That is, the predeceasing of the beneficiary defeats
the trust even without action by the depositor. Yet such a result could
only have been achieved as the majority reasoned it-by considering the
"in trust" deposit as creating a purely inchoate relationship held in abey-
ance, so far as the beneficiary is concerned, to the same extent as a devise
under a will, until the depositor's death.
17. Tibbits v. Zink, 231 App. Div. 339, 341, 247 N. Y. Supp. 300, 303 (3d Dep't,
193) (concerning evidence of revocability).
18. 117 App. Div. 178, 1O2 N. Y. Supp. 271 (ist Dep't, I907).
ig. Id. at i8o, io2 N. Y. Supp. at 272.
2o. Id. at 181, io2 N. Y. Supp. at 273.
21. Id. at 182, io2 N. Y. Supp. at 273.
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A corollary of the above proposition, and substantiating it, is the
accepted principle that the beneficiary of a Totten trust has no interest
until the depositor's death.22  Were there here a validly created trust,
though revocable, this conclusion could not follow for the cestui of an
ordinary trust not only has an interest but may alienate it despite its con-
tingent nature or its defeasibility.23
The first cases to be considered are those which concern a creditor's
right to reach the proceeds of the tentative trust when the depositor's
estate was insufficient. This right was early upheld in Beakes Dairy Co.
v. Berns.2 4  Concerning that case, it has been said by a recent decision
involving the same facts that it was a "directly pertinent pronouncement
* . . determining that so far as creditors of the depositor are concerned
the effective moment of the devolution is that of his death." 25 The Beakes
case holds that since the depositor had control of the funds during his
lifetime and could have satisfied the claims, the transfer at death which
completes the gift and creates the trust is considered a fraud on the cred-
itor which can be set aside.26 Yet, if the trust were a completed inter vivos
transaction, setting it aside on the grounds of fraud could only be possible
if the intent to defraud were present when the deposit was made.2 7  Situa-
tions involving actual fraud at that time do occur.28 However, there is no
suggestion in the cases that the rights of creditors are so limited. Yet it
would be difficult to impose the constructive fraudulent intent as to debts
contracted years after the creation of the "trust" especially if the depositor
were at the time of depositing entirely solvent. The attitude of the Beakes
case on the theory of the tentative trust is made the more unmistakable
and authoritative when it is seen that it was not necessary to adopt this
rationale to secure the payment of the creditors. That could have been
accomplished, as it was to funeral and administrative expenses after the
depositor's death, 29 by considering the presumption of an absolute trust as
to the balance remaining on deposit to be rebutted to the extent necessary
to pay such creditors.
To like effect are the early holdings on the question whether the trans-
mission of the avails of a tentative trust is in effect a testamentary act in
derogation of the rights of the surviving spouse to take against the estate.
Here the issue regains the aspect of a controversy between the beneficiary
and the estate, for a wife wishing to take against the beneficiary must first
establish the estate's right to the deposit. But for the first time in this
type case the difference in theory is claimed by the parties to require
different results, i. e., if inter vivos the estate prevails, if arising at death
the wife prevails for it is a testamentary transfer in derogation of her
rights. The matter was first presented collaterally in Matter of Clark's
Estate.80 If the wife took the proceeds under the Decedents' Estates Law 31
22. Matter of Kelly, 151 Misc. 277, 271 N. Y. Supp. 457 (Surr. Ct. 1934); see
Matter of Vaughan, 145 Misc. 332, 26o N. Y. Supp. 197 (Surr. Ct. 1932).
23. I BOGERT, op. cit. supra note x, § 188.
24. 128 App. Div. 137, 112 N. Y. Supp. 529 (2d Dep't, 1908).
25. Matter of Weinberg, 162 Misc. 867, 873, 296 N. Y. Supp. 7, 16 (Surr. Ct. i937).
26. Beakes Dairy Co. v. Berns, 128 App. Div. 137, 112 N. Y. Supp. 529 (2d Dep't,
19o8). See also In re Reich's Estate, 146 Misc. 616, 262 N. Y. Supp. 623 (Surr. Ct.
1933).
27. As to setting aside trust in general for fraud, see RE-STATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935)
§63.
28. Matter of Weinberg, 162 Misc. 867, z)6 N. Y. Supp. 7 (Surr. Ct. 1937).
29. it re Reich's Estate, 146 Misc. 616, 62o, 262 N. Y. Supp. 623, 627 (Surr. Ct.
1933) ; RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 58, comment c.
3o. 149 Misc. 374, 268 N. Y. Supp. 253 (Surr. Ct. 1933).
31. 13 N. Y. CONSOL. LAWs (McKinney, Supp. 1938) § i8.
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they were not taxable, being less than the exemption sum. If the bene-
ficiary took, the proceeds of the deposit are taxable. The court sustained
the tax, holding that the provisions of the Decedents' Estates Law had no
applicability to the tentative trust as the proceeds of the "trust" were not
part of the decedent's estate which would have passed by intestacy and
against which the wife could take. The court recognized, as the wife con-
tended, that the trust arose at the moment of death, and that it was death
which effectuated the transfer, but it held despite that fact that the Totten
trust formed no more a part of the decedent's estate than the subject mat-
ter of a joint tenancy with survivorship wherein the interest of the survivor
in the whole of the property ripens at the death of one of the joint tenants.
3 2
Recently a case has been decided by a Special Term of the New York Su-
preme Court allowing the wife to take against the "trust" deposit because
of its "testamentary" nature.1
3
The final category to be considered are the tax cases. They are in-
teresting insofar as they do not represent any departure from the theory
that the trust does not spring into being until death. On the basis of the
depositor's right to control, the interests granted the beneficiary were con-
sidered as only intended to take effect in possession and enjoyment at or
after death in In re Barbey's Estate.84 Such interests were held to be iden-
tical with those passing by will. The transfers are within the purpose and
express language of the decedent estate statute and they are taxable.3 5
However, since the New York view as to ordinary revocable trusts is,
that as far as taxation purposes is concerned, they too are transfers taking
effect at death, 86 the acceptance of the inter Zdvos revocable trust theory of
the tentative trust would have produced the same result.
However that may be, this resume of the New York cases demon-
strates that the tentative trust is considered to be testamentary in char-
acter, which means that the moment of its creation is the moment of the
depositor's demise. That is true despite Professor Scott's comment that
the tentative trust should be considered testamentary in nature even if it
is thought to be a completed inter vivos revocable trust from the moment
of deposit.37 It is true that for the purposes of some statutes any revocable
trust would be considered testamentary, i. e., the New York inheritance
tax statute and the Decedents' Estates Law. But that result is not universal
even under such statutes.33 In addition we have seen situations not under
statutes where the inter vivos theory is inapplicable. Both of these factors
would seem to weaken the assertion that the tentative trust should be con-
sidered testamentary in nature even though it be a completed inter vivos
32. Matter of Schurer's Estate, 157 Misc. 573, 248 N. Y. Supp. 28 (Surr. Ct.
1935), aft'd, 248 App. Div. 697, 289 N. Y. Supp. 818 (ist Dep't, 1936); Matter of
Clark's Estate, I49 Misc. 374, 268 N. Y. Supp. 253 (Surr. Ct 1933) ; Matter of Yarme's
Estate, 148 Misc. 457, 266 N. Y. Supp. 93 (Surr. Ct. 1933), aff'd, 242 App. Div. 693,
273 N. Y. Supp. 403 (2d Dep't, 1934).
33. Murray v. Brooklyn Savings Bank, 9 N. Y. S. (2d) 227 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
34. 114 N. Y. Supp. 725 (Surr. Ct i9o8).
35. Ibid. See also: Matter of Halligan, 82 Misc. 30, 143 N. Y. Supp. 676 (Surr.
Ct. 1913) ; Matter of Bender, 182 N. Y. Supp. 217 (Surr. Ct. I915); Matter of Kier-
nan, 134 Misc. 868, 237 N. Y. Supp. 29o (Surr. Ct. 1929) ; Matter of Clark's Estate,
149 Misc. 374, 268 N. Y. Supp. 253 (Surr. Ct. 1933).
36. Matter of Bostwick, i6o N. Y. 489, 55 N. E. 208 (1899), with which compare
In re Pierce's Estate, 132 App. Div. 465, 116 N. Y. Supp. 816 (4th Dep't, io9). For
the latest view see 59 N. Y. CoNsoL LAWS (McKinney, 1937) § 249-r, subdiv. 4, and
Matter of Brown, 153 Misc. 70, 274 N. Y. Supp. 463 (Surr. Ct. 1934).
37. Scott, loc. cit. mspra note 15.
38. See In re Dolan's Estate, 279 Pa. 582, 124 Atl. 176 (1924).
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relationship.3 9 At any rate, whether the creation at the moment of death
theory of the tentative trust be correct or not, the least that can be said
is that the New York courts refuse to apply stringent trust concepts to
settle problems arising before the depositor's death. In view of the reason
for the tentative trust-to secure the passage of the remainder of the de-
posit to the beneficiary without the making of a will-this is a sensible
approach.
Turning to authorities outside New York, one finds that when the
American Law Institute adopted a tentative trust section for its Restate-
ment of Trusts 40 the important black-letter passage attempted a mere re-
phrasing of the exact rule of the Totten case. The subsequent additions to
the doctrine, such as holding the predeceasing of the beneficiary defeats
the trust and upholding a creditor's rights to reach the proceeds, were
dealt with in the comments. There are two things appearing in the
section which are possible intimations of the theory behind the tentative
trust concept. The first is the use of the word "trust" in the black-letter
passage to refer to the tentative trust concept. That, however, is at the
very least rendered ambiguous authority by the concurrent use of "intended
trust" in the same passage. The second suggestion is the adoption in com-
ment b of the principle that the predeceasing of the beneficiary defeats the
trust. If the rationalization of such an addition to the main doctrine as
hereinbefore attempted is the single possible one, then it is inferable here
that the Restatement adopts the theory that a tentative trust is an inchoate,
incomplete relationship until the depositor's death. But such is only an
inference, and the question as far as the language of the section goes re-
mains unsettled.
There were, however, two jurisdictions in addition to New York which
were considered as having accepted the tentative trust doctrine when the
adoption of the section was contemplated. These were Minnesota and
Maryland. The Minnesota case of Walso v. Latterner 41 contains no en-
lightenment as to any theoretical concept. It appears merely to adopt the
New York view that a deposit "in trust for" is sufficient evidence of the
depositor's intent to make a gift, rather than accepting the Massachusetts
view that such a deposit, coupled with retention of the pass-book, is not.
42
But the court seems not at all clear as to what a tentative trust is, it having
considered the depositor's withdrawals unimportant to the decision. Never-
theless, subsequently in Minnesota it has been interpreted as introducing
the doctrine of the tentative trust there in Coughlin v. Farmers & Me-
chanics Savings Bank.43 This latest Minnesota case cites the Walso case,
and a decision which relied solely upon it,44 as settling the issue whether
"these trusts were testamentary in character and did not become effective in
his lifetime." 4- It said: "Trusts of the kind here involved have been held
valid as express trusts under our statutes and to vest title to funds depos-
39. The RESTATEMENT § 57 (3) states that except for the tentative trust, if a
settlor reserves the right to deal with the property as he likes as long as he lives, the
trust is testamentary. This would seem to mean that the factor of control should have
no significance in determining the testamentary nature of the tentative trust.
40. RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 58.
41. 140 Minn. 455, 168 N. W. 353 (I918), 143 Minn. 364, 173 N. W. 71I (919).
42. Brabook v. Savings Bank, lO4 Mass. 228 (187o). See BoGERT, loc. cit. supra
note i.
43. igg Minn. lO2, 272 N. W. 166 (1937).
44. Dyste v. Farmers & Mechanics Savings Bank, 179 Minn. 430, 229 N. W. 865
(1930).
45. Coughlin v. Farmers & Mechanics Savings Bank, igg Minn. l2, 2O4, 272 N.
W. 166, 167 (1937).
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ited in the donee or donees unless disaffirmed by the depositor before his
death, or set aside for fraud or incompetency." 46 Thus, with some hesi-
tancy, Minnesota can be said to propound a theory different from the state
of the tentative trust's origin.
The Maryland cases present a slight improvement as to clarity, the
latest contribution before the Restatement speaking in terms of a "gift"
and conveying the impression of a completed relationship, subject to revo-
cation, upon the making of the deposit.4 7  Thus, with a possible split in
theory existing among the authorities on which it relied, plus the reporter's
conviction that the New York concept is that a trust is created at the mo-
ment of deposit,48 it is evident that the Restatement is not authoritative on
the question of theory.
Since the tentative draft of the Restatement was promulgated, two
jurisdictions are considered as having adopted the tentative trust idea. They
are Pennsylvania, where it has undoubtedly been accepted, and California,
where its status is in doubt. In California, Kuck z. Raftery " is the leading
case. The significance of its holding even the California courts dispute.50
In it there was established a deposit "in trust for" and the beneficiary
signed the deposit card. There were no withdrawals. The administrator
of the estate sought to recover the fund, attacking the deposit as an invalid
trust because the depositor retained the power of withdrawal. The court
rejected this contention on the authority of cases wherein the creation of
a joint account by a depositor payable to himself and to others creates a
trust for the others, though the power to revoke by withdrawal remained.
The court felt that conceding the possibility of the creation of a revocable
trust, it could decide the case on the basis of either the New York view
of tentative trusts or the Massachusetts view which recognizes only irrevo-
cable trusts in savings accounts, because there was ample evidence of the
intent of the depositor, in addition to the mere form of the account, to
satisfy the Massachusetts view in this regard. Therefore, if the Totten rule
is recognized in California, 5' its basic concept would seem to be that of an
immediate interest being created at the time of the deposit. The analogous
situation upon which the court relied to establish the essential element of
revocability by withdrawal, i. e., that of revocable trusts in joint accounts,
is a completed trust relationship at the moment of deposit.52  Furthermore,
since the Massachusetts view of savings bank accounts "in trust for" is
a very definite concept of an irrevocable, completed trust, there is little
room to doubt that the California court likened the New York idea to this
rather than vice versa, especially when, as we have seen, there is dispute
as to what the New York view is.
A saving feature of the cases in these jurisdictions accepting the tenta-
tive trust is that they present, as did most of the New York cases, the
46. Ibid.
47. Sturgis v. Citizens National Bank of Pocomoke City, 152 Md. 654, I37 Atl. 378
(1927).
48. Scott, loc. cit. supra note I5.
49. 117 Cal. App. 755, 4 P. (2d) 552 (1931).
5o. Two years after the Kitck case a lower court stated that there had been no
adoption of the tentative trust theory in California. Sherman v. Hibernia Savings &
Loan Society, 129 Cal. App., Supp., 795, 20 P. (2d) 138 (1933). A still later case has
considered the holding in the Kuck case to have approved the doctrine of the Totten
case. Evinger v. MacDougall, 82 P. (2d) 194 (Dist. Ct. of Appeal, 1938).
51. There is no recognition in the Kuck case of the important element of a tenta-
tive trust that the mere deposit alone is sufficient to create the relationship.
52. Booth v. Oakland Bank of Savings, 122 Cal. 19, 54 Pac. 370 (x898). In these
joint account cases the relationship is so complete that the beneficiary could draw on
the fund.
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fundamental conflict between the beneficiary and the depositor's estate as
to the former's right to the proceeds. In addition, any reference to theory
is incidental or inferential, except the Minnesota case of Coughlin v. Farm-
ers and Mechanics Savings Bank.58 Consequently, these courts might not
feel constrained by any such theory to reach undesirable results such as
exemption from inheritance taxation or avoidance of the just claims of cred-
itors, when the primary purpose has already been served, that is, when the
beneficiary's right to the proceeds in the particular instance is assured.
The theoretical concept adopted by the lower courts in Pennsylvania
is similar to the Minnesota view. In point of fact, these lower court cases
are more decisive in resolving the conflict of theory. In each of three cases
the court was confronted with a different problem, each requiring for its
solution a determination of the exact moment of the creation of the trust.
Each case cited the Restatement. In Pozzuto's Estate 54 the depositor's
will revoked "all former wills, testaments, or writings in the nature
thereof . . ." The court said: "There is nothing in the writing creating
the trust in the case at bar that reasonably leads one to conclude that the
decedent intended the trust to be testamentary in character . . . Here the
deposit was 'in trust' and an immediate interest arose in the donee, subject
only to revocation by some unequivocal act, and no . . . testamentary
intent'appears . . ." -" In Kardon v. Willing the Federal District Court
in Pennsylvania refused to allow the creator of an "in trust" account to set
off the amount of it against his note to the closed bank, holding that "until
. . . revoked either by the depositor or his creditors it (the tentative
trust) remains in force and the beneficiary retains his beneficial interest
therein." 56 The final situation, In re Mines,57 concerned the liability of the
tentative trust for inheritance taxes. The court held it was not subject
to such taxation, saying: "The question involved really turns on whether
any interest was created in the cestui que trust in the lifetime of the
trustee. The last cited case (Pozzuto's Estate) is authority for the prop-
osition that the very form of such deposit creates 'an immediate inter-
est . . . in the donee . . .' "58 It is perhaps significant, to those who
look with disfavor upon such a view, that the Supreme Court of the state
has not so declared. The extent of its utterances on the subject of the
tentative trust consist of an express adoption of the rule in New York
"where litigation of trust bank accounts has been much greater than with
us".5 9  The court may decide to go all the way with New York. It is
possible, of course, that in the tax case the court was more concerned with
maintaining the uniformity of Pennsylvania inheritance tax law than with
applying the correct concept of the tentative trust. In holding the tenta-
tive trust not taxable, it adhered to the view of In re Dolan's Estate,60 that
the mere reservation of the power to revoke an ordinary trust does not
make it a transfer taking effect at death and subject to an inheritance tax.
As to the other two cases, there are lacking other reasons to justify their
conclusions. They may have been mistaken as to the meaning of the Re-
statement section, but they certainly relied on it.
53. 199 Minn. lO2, 272 N. W. 166 (1937).
54. 124 Pa. Super. 93, 188 Atl. 209 (8936).
55. Id. at 97, 99, 188 Atl. at 210, 211.
56. 2o F. Supp. 471, 473 (E. D. Pa. 1937), aff'd, C. C. A. 3d, Nov. 30, 1938, cert.
denied, U. S. Sup. Ct., April 3, 1939.
57. 31 Pa. D. & C. 153 (1937).
58. Id. at 157.
59. Scanlon's Estate, 313 Pa. 424, 427, 169 Atl. io6, io8 (1933).
6o. 279 Pa. 582, 124 Atl. 176 (1924).
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This completes the resume of the cases and authorities which are at
all reflective of a theory of tentative trusts. It appears the New York view
cannot be that a trust is created at the moment of deposit, for then the sub-
sequent decisions which have supplemented the doctrine, as in the case of
creditors' claims, and beneficiaries predeceasing the depositor as defeating
the "trust", etc., not only created additions to the rule but exceptions to
the principle. The New York cases do not fit into such a preconceived
notion. The Totten case is no longer the complete statement of the tenta-
tive trust rule in New York. Yet the "trust" theory can only be ration-
alized on that basis. Therefore, it would be more realistic to reject it in
favor of the "testamentary" theory or adhere to none at all.
As has been indicated, all the cases which may be deemed contra may
be rationalized or fairly disregarded by the highest courts of these states,
except Minnesota, where a reversal would be required. If the superiority
of the New York rule as herein established is conceded, it is lamentable
that the Restatement did not definitely take such a position in unmistak-
able terms. The effect of the black-letter material in the other direction
has not been very extensive, however. California reached its decisions
without reference to the Restatement, and the latest Maryland case had
recourse only to the comment to the section for its authority.6' It is only
in the Pennsylvania situation that a cursory reading of the black-letter
section has proved misleading.
In the absence of legislation to handle the situation,62 the great growth
of savings bank accounts appears to assure a great future expansion of
the doctrine to other jurisdictions and to justify an evaluation of the merits
of the doctrine. In addition to a home, usually held in the names of both
husband and wife as tenants by the entirety, the remaining worldly goods
of the ordinary person which would be subject to distribution as part of
his estate are the contents of savings accounts. The right of survivorship
would pass the home and the tentative trust doctrine the cash balance of
the normal estate without the necessity of making a will. The rights of
creditors are protected when the tentative trust is used, and there would
seem to be very little chance of any other fraud occurring of the type which
led to the passage of the Statute of Wills with its formalities and require-
ments. There would appear to be no other interests that need protection
and which might sustain a public policy refusing to recognize the tentative
trust as a valid exception to the Statute of Wills.
63
When a state does adopt the concept, the question then arises which
theory most equitably disposes of claims against the deposit, keeping in
mind at all time the intent of the depositor to get the proceeds to the bene-
ficiary. On the pragmatic side the Pennsylvania cases have shown the
kind of result to be derived from an application of the completed trust
concept. The depositor thinks of the nioney as his own during his life-
time. Therefore, to apply to such a situation a doctrine which induces the
idea of a mere legal title in him will be prone to produce other anomalous
results such as the Pennsylvania cases.
These could have been avoided by treating the tentative trust as a
testamentary disposition. Many other similar situations, it is felt, could
also be avoided.6 4 If it is desirable to have some theory upon which one
61. Bollack v. Bollack, i69 Md. 4o7, 182 AtI. 317 (1935). The case, however, did
not involve any theoretical aspect.
62. Legislation is suggested as the ideal solution. Note (934) 39 Dicx. L. REV.
37, 4L.
63. (938) 86 U. OF PA. L. REv. 321; id. at 789, 790.
64. Matter of Weinberg, 162 Misc. 867, 868, 296 N. Y. Supp. 7, io (Surr. Ct. 1937).
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might arrange the various incidents in orderly form, the "recognition of
the savings trust in its true character as an alternative method of decedent
devolution, which in certain aspects at least, is of essentially testamentary
character" 65 would conceivably be the best.
W. H. R., Jr.
Local Assessments for Reconstruction and Repairs and
Contractors' Guarantees
When as a result of a public improvement undertaken for the peculiar
convenience of a certain locality, particular property in that locality has
been benefited by an enhancement in value, the state may force that prop-
erty to share in the cost of the improvement. Such are the simple facts
of local assessment.
I. LOCAL ASSESSMENT IN GENERAL
It is not the purpose of this note to discuss in detail the nature of the
legislative power to make local assessments or the theory behind them.
However, in view of the scarcity of other materials on the subject, it does
seem desirable to make a brief mention of fundamentals.
The courts from the moment that they are forced to determine the
very nature of the power under which the state makes a local assessment
are in disagreement. Some declare it an exercise of the police power,'
others hold it derivative from the power of eminent domain,2 and still
others declare it to be only a special arm of the taxing power.3 The great
weight of authority and reason would seem to be with those courts which
look upon the local assessment as primarily in the nature of a tax,4 though
peculiar in form and substance.
As to the theory on which the local assessment rests, it is plain.
Where the state by a public improvement has specially benefited particular
property, it is felt that the property should to a special extent bear the
burden of the cost of the improvement. The assessment is merely an
exaction from the property of compensation for the benefit.5
Also clear is the fact that the power to make an assessment resides
solely in the state by virtue of its sovereign jurisdiction over taxation.
The state may, however, delegate to the municipalities within its borders
the authority to make local assessments. When it does, this authority is
strictly construed and any deviation from it will cause the assessment to
be void and incapable of placing a charge on the property assessed.,
II. LOCAL ASSESSMENT FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND REPAIRS
While the constitutionality of acts of the legislature or charters giving
authority to municipal bodies to make local assessments for the construc-
tion of local improvements is unquestioned, the validity of acts or charters
giving authority to assess for the reconstruction or repair of improvements
65. Ibid.
i. Reinken v. Fuehring, 13o Ind. 382, 3o N. E. 414 (1892) ; cf. Palmer v. Way, 6
Colo. io6 (i88i), and Keese v. Denver, IO Colo. 112, 15 Pac. 825 (1887).
2. Chicago v. Lamed, 34 Ill. 203 (1864).
3. See infra note 4.
4. BURROUGHS, TAXATION (1877) § 145; 5 McQuILLIN, MuIc r. CoR"ORATIONs
(2d ed. 1928) § 2165 and cases therein cited.
5. Illinois Central R. R. v. Decatur, x47 U. S. 19o (1893); Bauman v. Ross, 167
U. S. 548 (1897).
6. BURROUGHs, TAXATION (1877) § 148.
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has not been universally recognized. First should be noted the distinction
recognized by the courts between reconstruction and repair. In the words
of one court 7 which had the issue fairly before it:
"To 'repair' presupposes the existence of the thing to be re-
paired; . . . and, when we repair, we restore to a sound or good
state, after decay, waste, injury, or partial destruction, the existing
structure or thing which needs to be restored to its original condi-
tion.
"Reconstruction presupposes the nonexistence of the thing to be
reconstructed, as an entity; . . . and 'reconstruction' is defined as
follows: 'To construct again; to rebuild; to restore again as an entity
the thing which was lost or destroyed' . . ." s
The courts of Pennsylvania have declared acts or charters authorizing
assessment for either reconstruction or repair unconstitutional; and those
of Illinois and Massachusetts have invalidated acts or charters authorizing
assessment for repairs.9 In other jurisdictions it would seem that the
assessment for either reconstruction or repairs is unobjectionable.
The Pennsylvania Doctrine
The leading case in Pennsylvania on the constitutionality of acts or
charters giving authority to assess for reconstruction or repairs is Hammett
v. Philadelphia.0 Here an Act of Assembly authorized the city of Phila-
delphia to "occupy Broad Street . . . and from curb to curb thereof
. . . to improve the said street. . . ." The Select and Common Coun-
cils were authorized "to enact such ordinances or resolutions . . . as
may require the cost of said improvements to be paid by the owners of
the property abutting upon said street." The preamble of the act stated
that the street thereafter in its improved state should be "for the uses and
purposes of the public, and the benefits which will enure to them by
making and forever maintaining Broad Street . . . the principal avenue
of . . . the city." The city in pursuance of the Act passed an ordinance
requiring the street, which had been paved with cobbles a few years pre-
viously, to be re-paved with a superior type of surface and providing for
the assessment of abutting properties for the cost of the work. The
Supreme Court of the state declared the act unconstitutional and the assess-
ment void. Justice Sharswood in his opinion first admitted the power of
the legislature to authorize municipal corporations to assess properties
benefited by local improvements. He denied, however, the power of the
legislature to authorize local assessment to meet the expenses of activities
having as their primary object the convenience of the community at large,
since by the exercise of such a power the entire cost of government could
be placed upon the shoulders of one man. Thus, continued Justice Shars-
wood, where an improvement is made for the benefit of the general public
and is of such a nature that provision for it becomes a duty devolving upon
the general public, it cannot be paid for by forcing contribution from prop-
erty in the vicinity. The repavement or repair of a street is an improve-
ment of a purely general nature and one for which the community must
provide out of general funds. Furthermore, local assessments are only
7. Fuchs v. City of Cedar Rapids, i58 Iowa 392, 139 N. W. 903 (1913).
8. Id. at 396-7, 139 N. W. at 9o4.
9. Because of a strong dictum in Ankeny v. Spokane, 92 Wash. 544, 557, 159 Pac.
8o6, 80g (iri6), there is some reason to believe that perhaps Washington will fall
among those states outlawing assessments for repairs.
io. 65 Pa. 146 (187o).
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valid when special benefits have been conferred on property, and
.. . when a street is once opened and paved, thus assimilated with the
rest of the city and made a part of it, all the particular benefits to the
locality derived from the improvement have been received." "I Aware that
the constitution of the state had no provision restricting the legislature in
the exercise of its power to tax, Justice Sharswood declared that he did
not care whether the assessment for general purposes and not in accord-
ance with particular benefits conferred be called confiscation or the taking
of private property without compensation; it is invalid as being violative
of the property rights sought to be protected by the Declaration of Rights.
The importance of the Hammett case in relation to decisions in other
jurisdictions lies in the judicial declarations that reconstruction and re-
pairs are improvements general rather than local in character and that
they cannot confer special benefits. Admittedly if either is so, the con-
clusion of invalidity for the assessment is correct. Yet the flat judicial
determination of these propositions was evidently unsatisfactory, for time
and again a hopeful legislature and various municipalities tested the
court's persistence in its novel doctrine. And there were more than selfish
reasons for so doing, for either of the apparent bases of the decision are
easily refutable. First, it is perfectly conceivable that in a particular
instance reconstruction or repairs of an improvement should be of special
interest to a certain locality. At least, there is no reason why the con-
struction of a street, for instance, should constitute a local improvement,
and the subsequent betterment of the same street should be considered an
improvement general in character. Justice Sharswood's apparent answer
to this argument was that the distinction lies in the fact that it is the duty
of the municipality to maintain streets as it is not to construct them. But
this is no answer at all, only conclusion. Second, it is both unrealistic
and untrue to say that reconstruction or repair cannot confer benefit on
particular property. Both can, and do.
Thus it becomes difficult to believe that the language of the Hammett
decision came solely as the result of legalistic reasoning. What, then, is
a proper rationale of the decision? In the belief of the writer, it can be
developed from two human factors: first, the conservative disposition of
the Pennsylvania court in the face of a situation fraught with possibilities
for interference with the right of private property, and second, the court's
doubts as to the trustworthiness of municipal authorities in the use of the
power to assess. Justice Sharswood emphasized the duty of the judiciary
to protect the property of the individual, be he poor or wealthy, from the
act of the "hydra-headed monster, a numerical majority, or that of the
single aristocrat", 12 pointing out that by an unrestricted power of assess-
ment the whole cost of government might be placed upon a few; and he
envisioned assessment of property for improvements of a purely esthetic
advantage to the public by a municipality more sensitive to the general
public convenience than to the property interests of its individuals. He
felt it imperative on the judiciary to call a halt to a doctrine, which, with
a certain tone of displeasure, he admitted to be settled. That what the
court was aiming at particularly was the protection of private property
against unrestrained pursuit of the doctrine of local assessment, rather
than a strict determination of whether either reconstruction or repair
should rightfully come within the doctrine, seems clearer upon an inspec-
tion of the case of Washington Avenue,13 decided only two years later.
ii. Id. at 156.
12. Id. at 153.
13. 69 Pa. 352 (1871).
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There Justice Agnew says of the Hamrnmett case, in which he had concurred
in the majority opinion:
" . I consider it a fortunate circumstance that that case came up,
for it led to an inquiry into the power of special taxation, which was
in danger of running wild by insensitive degrees, and leading, before
we had become aware of it, into the exercise of a bastard power to
the right of private property, and violative of the provisions of the
Bill of Rights, placed there for its protection. In questions of power
exercised by agents, it is sometimes the misfortune of communities
to be carried, step by step, into the exercise of illegitimate powers
without perceiving the progression, until the usurpations become so
firmly fixed by precedents, it seems impossible to recede or break
through them." ' 4
This, without a single word in justification of the arbitrary decisions in
the Hammett case that reconstruction and repairs could not be local im-
provements within the doctrine of local assessment or confer special bene-
fits. Thus the Pennsylvania rule was launched.
For several reasons there was no real cause that the Hammett opinion
should be decisive of the invalidity of local assessment for reconstruction
and repair, even though the language there used was sufficiently clear. First
of all there is one sentence in the little case of Weber v. Reinhard,"5 indi-
cating that perhaps it was not the intention of the court which decided the
Hammett case to outlaw every assessment for reconstruction or repair.
In upholding a tax imposed on iron companies for the privilege of using
township roads, the supreme court said of the Hammett case that "It did
not question the constitutional right of the legislature to confer upon
municipal corporations the power of taxing properties benefited by local
improvements for the cost of making or maintaining them, but placed upon
it the just and salutary restriction that it should be limited to the special
benefits conferred by the improvements, and not extend beyond them;
that the legislature could not authorize a tax to be levied on particular
property in a designated locality for a general purpose, to which the whole
community ought equally to contribute". 16 Added significance is given to
this apparent denial that the Hammett case meant to prohibit any and
every assessment for reconstruction or repairs by the fact that it was
expressed by Justice. Sharswood. No subsequent court, if referred to
Weber v. Reinhard, appears to have thought this sentence of any im-
portance.
Further weight is added to the belief that the Hammett decision need
not have definitely determined the question of the constitutionality of
assessments for reconstruction and repair by the fact that if ever there was
a case ideal for distinguishment, it was the Hammett case. Two elements
were present in that situation which made it peculiarly unseemly that
adjoining properties should be assessed for the repavement of Broad Street.
First, the avowed purpose of the Act of Assembly was to make Broad
Street the "principal avenue" of the city "for the uses and purposes of the
public, and the benefit which [would] enure to them" therefrom. This
language Justice Sharswood believed, 17 and it seems rightly, imported an
undertaking primarily for the benefit of the general public. The second
element making the case peculiar was that Broad Street had been paved
14. Id. at 364.
15. 73 Pa. 370 (1873).
i6. Id. at 373 (ital. supplied).
1T. Hammett v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa. 146, 157 (i87o).
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at the expense of the property owners only two years previous to the Act
of Assembly authorizing the repavement and assessment. To this fact
Justice Sharswood refers as indicative of the injustice of the assessment
in question.
Yet only one case can be found which points to the fact that the
peculiar circumstances of the Hammett case might have had something to
do with the decision and that perhaps the language of the opinion should
not be separated from the facts. In the case of Michener v. Philadelphia,
8
Justice Paxson had this to say of our leading case: "Hammett v. The City
appears to have been misunderstood to some extent. At least it is fre-
quently cited as covering a much broader view than its facts and the deci-
sion thereon warrant. [There] the owners of property on Broad Street
were directed by an Act of Assembly to take up the pavement which they
had paid for and lay down a new and expensive one, not for the benefit of
their property but to provide a grand drive or boulevard for the public
generally." 19 It is unfortunate for the true and historical doctrine of
local assessment that the exact decision in the Michener case could not
restrict the language of the Hammett case, 20 which has since been taken
to outlaw assessment for every reconstruction or repair.
For the rest, the history of the doctrine of the Hammett case in the
Pennsylvania courts, most of which have appeared more vigilant in the
protection of private property than the court which founded the doctrine,
is one of steady application and even, in some instances, extension. Even
before the Michener case it was held that certainly there could be no
assessment for maintenance and repair; 21 and one year after the Michener
decision the doctrine that there could be no assessment for repairs was
reaffirmed,2 2 never again to be doubted in the state. Only one of Justice
Sharswood's statements in the Hammett case has ever been disavowed,
and this neither intentionally nor expressly. In the case of Morewood
Avenue,2 3 the court explains that the fundamental idea of the Hammett
case was that "Local assessments could only be made for improvements
which conferred peculiar local benefits upon property which adjoined the
improvement, and even then it could not be made after the property had
once been subjected to assessment." 24 It will be recalled that Justice
Sharswood declared that after the improvement had been once constructed
no special benefit could later be conferred upon property adjoining.
Only a few of the applications of the doctrine of the Hammett case
require special mentioning. It would seem that the important element in
precluding the assessment is not, as the language of the Morewood case
would imply, that the property has been once assessed for repairs, but
rather that the improvement has once been made, whether at the expense
of the adjoining property or of the municipality. 5  But the fact that the
property owner has built at his own expense a sewer for private use will
not preclude assessment by the municipality for a subsequently constructed
public sewer .2  Where a sewer has once been constructed, there may be
18. 118 Pa. 535, 12 Atl. 174 (1888).
19. Id. at 539, 12 Atl. at 175.
2o. No question of reconstruction or repair was present in the Michener case, the
assessment there being for the original construction of a sewer.
21. Appeal of the Protestant Orphans Asylum, iii Pa. 135, 3 Atl. 217 (1886).
22. Williamsport v. Beck, 128 Pa. 20, 28 Atl. 123 (1893).
23. 159 Pa. 20, 28 Atl. 123 (893).
24. Id. at 28, 18 Atl. at 126 (ital. supplied).
25. Williamsport v. Beck, 128 Pa. 147, 18 AtI. 329 (1889) ; Harrisburg v. Segel-
baum, 151 Pa. 172, 24 Atl. 1070 (1892).
26. Philadelphia v. Odd Fellows, 168 Pa. 105, 31 Atl. 917 (1895).
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no subsequent assessment for reconstruction. 27 Where all but the middle
portion of a street has been paved previously and the cost defrayed by
local assessment, an assessment for the subsequent pavement of the middle
portion will be valid, since, according to the rule of the Hammett case, no
benefit has yet been received from any improvement to that part of the
street.2 8 And finally, the Hammett rule does not apply to repairs to side-
walks, since in every case in which a sidewalk is bettered special benefit is
conferred upon the property owner.
2 9
The Rule in Illinois and Massachusetts
No other state has gone so far as Pennsylvania in invalidating assess-
ments, the rule in all other jurisdictions being that assessments for the
reconstruction of local improvements is a constitutional exercise of the
taxing power. But Illinois and Massachusetts have declared statutes
authorizing assessments for repairs unconstitutional.
The roots of the Illinois restriction on the power to authorize local
assessments can be traced to Hammett v. Philadelphia from which in
Crane v. West Chicago Park Commrs.30 the Illinois court quoted to show
that repairs cannot confer a special benefit, and to the doctrine, peculiar
to that state, that in order for a particular work to be a local improvement
it must be permanent in nature.3' The Illinois court classified repairing
with street cleaning and sprinkling among those improvements which, be-
cause of their "evanescent" nature, cannot be classified as local improve-
ments within the principles upon which all assessments rest.
The Massachusetts determination in the case of Sears v. Street
Cominrs.32 that there can be no constitutional assessment for repairs rests
on the sole ground that repairs can confer no special benefit on property
adjoining, and derives its authority from the Pennsylvania cases stemming
from Hammett v. Philadelphia.
Unlike Pennsylvania and Illinois, Massachusetts has not been notably
consistent in its doctrine that the assessment for repairs is unconstitu-
tional. In the Sears case a board of street commissioners was authorized
by statute to assess property for the construction, maintenance and opera-
tion of sewers. Sewer charges were levied on property owners not only
for general construction but also for maintenance and operation. The basis
of computation was the value of the land assessed. As we have mentioned,
the Supreme Judicial Court in unanimously declaring the statute unconsti-
tutional, expressed the belief that an assessment for maintenance could
not of necessity be based on special benefits. Just a year later, there came
before this same court the case of Carson v. Brockton,"3 involving a statute
authorizing city councils to establish rental charges or rents for the use of
sewers. In pursuance of this authority, the city council of Brockton made
charges on the basis of the number of gallons of sewage delivered to the
27. Erie v. Russell, 148 Pa. 484, 23 Atl. 1102 (1892). It is worthy of note that
Justice Sharswood in the Hammett case speaks always in terms of repairs. But what
was actually decided in that case was that an assessment for reconstruction (repave-
ment) was unconstitutional. The courts which followed, while observing the language
of the opinion, did not ignore the decision, and declared assessments for reconstruction
and repairs invalid indiscriminately.
28. Alcorn v. Philadelphia, 112 Pa. 494, 4 Atl. 185 (1886).
29. Smith v. Kingston Borough, 12o Pa. 357, 14 Atl. 170 (888).
30. 153 Ill. 348, 38 N. E. 943 (1894).
31. Chicago v. Blair, 149 Ill. 310, 36 N. E. 829 (1894) ; Waukegan v. DeWolf, 258
Ill. 374, ioi N. E. 532 (1913) ; Rienzi v. Lincoln Park, 198 Ill. App. 218 (1916).
32. 173 Mass. 350, 53 N. E. 876 (1899).
33. 175 Mass. 242, 56 N. E. I (igoo).
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sewers. The statute was upheld by a unanimous court, Chief Justice
Holmes in his opinion stating:
"We are of opinion that the petitioner received a special benefit
for which he might be charged, and that this case is free from the
elements which in Sears v. Street Commrs. led to the conclusion that
the petitioner was assessed without regard to the benefits received
by him. No one denies that it was a special benefit to the petitioner
to have a sewer built in front of his land. . . . If building a sewer
was a special benefit, keeping the sewer in condition for use by such
further expenditure as was necessary was a further special benefit to
such as used it." '4
Chief Justice Holmes goes on to say that the charge here, unlike that of
the Sears case, was definitely based on benefits, since it was levied accord-
ing to use, "which is a reasonable way of estimating the benefits con-
ferred." '5
It is not easy to reconcile this holding with the statement of the
Sears case that "Where lands have paid assessments for special benefits
from the construction of all sewers by whose operation they are affected,
it cannot be said that they receive an additional special and peculiar benefit
from the general oversight and operation of the sewers. . . ." The
Supreme Court of the United States, when the case came before it, ad-
mitted that it could not readily perceive a distinction between the cases."
Two years after the Carson case still another sewer assessment act
was attacked before the Massachusetts court on the grounds that it author-
ized assessment for repairs.37 In upholding the act, Chief Justice Holmes
remarked:
"It is suggested that the language of the act extends to expendi-
ture for maintaining the sewer and is bad on that ground. We do not
understand it to have that meaning. Therefore it is unnecessary to
discuss Carson v. Brockton . . . and Sears v. Street Commrs.
. . . which seem to have appeared to the Supreme Court of the
United States to be less reconcilable than we had supposed." 88
It is properly inferable from these cases that Massachusetts would still
declare an assessment clearly for repairs only, and not levied according to
use as in the Carson case, a deprivation of property without due process.
It is clear, however, that in Massachusetts an assessment for reconstruc-
tion is valid.39
III. Co NRACTORS' GUARANTEES
While in jurisdictions other than Pennsylvania, Illinois, and Massa-
chusetts there is no constitutional restriction on the power to authorize
assessments for the repair of local improvements, such authorization is
seldom given. The reasons for this are in the main the same as the objec-
34. Id. at 243-4, 56 N. E. at i.
35. Id. at 244, 56 N. E. at i.
36. Carson v. Brockton Sewerage Comm., 182 U. S. 398 (igoo).
37. Smith v. City of Worcester, 182 Mass. 232, 65 N. E. 40 (92).
38. Id. at 236, 65 N. W. at 42.
39. Sayles v. Board of Public Works of Pittsfield, 222 Mass. 93, log N. E. 823
0915). In Union Street Ry. v. New Bedford, 253 Mass. 304, 149 N. E. 42 (1925), an
assessment was made to pay for the widening of a street. The court upheld the assess-
ment, using throughout the word "betterment" to describe the improvement. In this
case the benefits to the land assessed had been used as the basis of the assessment. See
also Crofts v. Benoit, 261 Mass. 191, i58 N. E. 561 (1927).
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tions to assessments for such a purpose voiced by Justice Sharswood in
the Hammett case. First, it is felt that the repair of improvements is a
duty which should fall on the public in most instances, even though it may
and frequently does peculiarly benefit local owners. Second, there is
always the danger of the discrimination and fraud of which Justice Shars-
wood was so wary, where local officers are vested with such wide powers
of assessment. 40 The legislatures, probably wisely, have not been disposed
to ignore the great possibility of tie-ups between politicians and contractors.
Perhaps a third reason why authority to assess for repairs is not more
often given is the administrative problem which would be created if in
every case where repairs are needed the property adjoining should be
assessed. It would be entirely possible that, in most cases, the costs of
laying out an assessment district and otherwise effectuating the levy would
devour the amount which could constitutionally be assessed against ad-
joining property.
A great body of litigation has grown up as a result of the diligence
of local authorities in getting contractors' guarantees on work which has
been awarded where, in the particular jurisdiction, an assessment for re-
pairs is unconstitutional, or, if constitutional, has not been authorized by act
or charter. The classic objection to these guarantees has been that they
have the effect of charging upon properties which are liable to assessment
for the construction only of the improvement, the additional burden of
repairs, contrary to fundamental law, or the act or charter pertinent. The
classic resolution of the problem thus presented to the courts has been by
the determination of whether the particular guarantee is of the quality of
the workmanship and materials put into the original construction or
whether it really amounts to an undertaking by the contractor to keep the
improvement in repair whatever the nature of the defects which may sub-
sequently appear. If the guarantee appears to be of the former kind, it
will be declared valid as imposing no burden on the contractor, and hence
on the property assessed, that he or it would not otherwise have to assume,
and as being, in truth, a protection to the property against slovenly con-
struction and resultant later assessments. If the guarantee is of the latter
type it is illegal, its effect being to charge the property with a burden which
it cannot be required to assume.4-
There has been little uniformity in the language or requirements of
the guarantees which have come before the courts, and consequently no
more uniformity of decision. Each of the cases has been decided more or
less on its own facts. Yet, we find the courts applying certain tests to the
guarantees as aids in placing them in one or the other of the two cate-
gories. Few courts in a particular case will use only one of the traditional
tests, and similarly few will use all. But if one test is omitted in one case
it will recur in the next, so that all are of fairly common coinage. It is the
purpose of the writer in the remaining portion of this note, to mention the
more important of these tests and outline their workings.
The Wording of the Guarantee
Invariably where the guarantee is to make repairs which shall be
deemed necessary "because of imperfections in said work, or materials
used",4 2 or that "the work done under this contract, and the materials used
40. See the opinions of Kansas City v. Hanson, 8 Kan. App. 290, 5 Pac. 513
(1898), fev'd, 6o Kan. 833, s8 Pac. 474 (1899) and Williamsport v. Beck, 128 Pa. 147,
I8 At!. 329 (x889).
41. 5 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 2179.
42. Hodges v. Roswell, 31 N. M. 388, 347 Pac. 310 (1926).
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in the construction of the same are free from defects or flaws", 43 or where
by any other language it is made clear that the municipality is bargaining
for no more than an assurance that the work will be well done, 44 the
ordinance or contract of which the guarantee is a part will be upheld.
However, since the tendency of the courts has been to uphold contracts
containing guarantees because of their belief that the public needs pro-
tection against dishonest contractors, it is not equally clear, where the
language of guarantee imports an obligation to repair all defects which
might arise, that the assessment will be invalidated. Thus where the con-
tractor covenanted ". . . that [he] will do all work required in such
good and substantial manner that no repairs will be needed",45 he has been
held to have guaranteed his workmanship only. The same result has been
reached where the guarantee stipulated that the work shall be and remain
at the end of the guarantee period in as good condition as when turned
over to the city.4 6 However, in the ordinary case where there is nothing
whatsoever to show that the guarantee is of workmanship or materials,
and the obligation to repair is absolute, the court will invalidate the con-
tract and assessment, unless by one of the other tests it can manage to
uphold it.4 7 Especially interesting are those cases in which in one part of
the contract the guarantee appears to cover all repairs and in another
seems to concern defects arising from defective workmanship and materials
only. In these cases, the courts' tendency to favor the contracts manifests
itself in an emphasis on the stipulations indicating a guarantee of fitness
only and in the declaration by the courts that it is these stipulations which
truly define the intent of the parties.
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The Burden Cast Upon the Property
If the act of the legislature or the municipal charter gives authority
to assess for the construction of an improvement but not for repairs to it,
the liability of property adjoining should be limited to the costs of con-
struction. Thus the fundamental objection to contractors' guarantees is
that they throw upon property a burden not authorized by the legislature.
So it is that the courts, in determining whether a contract containing a
guarantee is valid or not, often look to the practical effect of the guarantee
upon the contract price. Where the guarantee places upon the contractor
the obligation to repair all defects, the argument is made that the con-
tractor would not undertake such an obligation without raising his bid
for the work, although it is expressly stated in the ordinance under which
the contract is let that the burden of repairs shall be entirely upon him.40
While realistic, this argument would, it is submitted, cause an invalidation
of every contract of guarantee; for it is certain that no contractor is going
to bid as low in a case where a guarantee must be given as where not, no
matter how clear it is that he will be required to repair defects due only to
poor work, and no matter how great his confidence in his ability to do a
perfect job.
43. Louisville v. Mehler, 1o8 Ky. 436, 56 S. W. 712 (igoo).
44. New Haven v. Eastern Paving Brick Co., 78 Conn. 689, 63 Atl. 517 (io6);
Osburn v. Lyons, 3O4 Iowa I6, 73 N. W. 442 (1898) ; Robertson v. Omaha, 55 Neb.
718, 76 N. W. 442 (1898) ; Lawrence v. Portland, 85 Ore. 586, 167 Pac. 587 (1917).
45. Schenectady v. Union College, 66 Hun 179, 21 N. Y. Supp. I47 (Sup. Ct. 1892).
46. Hedge v. Des Moines, 141 Iowa 4, 339 N. W. 276 (i9og).
47. Fehler v. Gosnell, 99 Ky. 380, 35 S. W. 1125 (1898) ; Bullitt v. Selvage, 2o Ky.
L. R. 599, 47 S. W. 255 (1898) ; Boyd v. Milwaukee, 92 Wis. 456, 66 N. W. 6o3 (1896).
48. Wheeler v. Dist. Court, 8o Minn. 293, 83 N. W. 183 (igoo).
49. Brown v. Jenks, 98 Cal. 10, 32 Pac. 701 (1893) ; People v. Maher, 56 Hun 81,
9 N. Y. Supp. 94 (Sup. Ct. 389o).
NOTES
At least one case 5 0 declares that when, as security for the perform-
ance of the guarantee, bonds are required to be posted by the contractor,
the contract should be invalid, since the necessity of drawing assets from
his business would inevitably cause the contractor to raise the amount of
his bid for the construction. This argument, also, would cause the in-
validation of almost every contract containing a guarantee, since in prac-
tically every instance some security entailing extra expenditure on the part
of the contractor is required.
In some cases a finding by the court that no added burden has been
imposed on the contractor has prevented the assessment from being invalid
even where the guarantee contains words indicating an obligation to make
all repairs. In Pennsylvania, if the court can find that the guarantee is
such that no burden is placed on the contractor beyond that which he
would assume if no guarantee were required, the assessment will be up-
held. " This test requires an inspection by the court into the nature of
the improvement and the length of time which, if properly constructed, it
should last without repairs. A New York case upheld an assessment for
construction done under a guarantee calling for general repairs to be made
by the contractor, where it was shown that the bid for this job was the
same as that for identical work done under a contract containing no
guarantee.
5 2
An interesting problem arises where, under statutes giving authority
to assess for the repair of existing defects, a guarantee of repairs gen-
erally has been required of the contractor. Here the courts have taken the
view that an unauthorized burden has been placed upon the property
assessed since by the statute it can be assessed only for repairs which have
once become necessary, whereas by the guarantee it is made to bear the
burden of anticipated repairs which may never come into actual being and
for which there may never be liability.5
The Length of Time Covered by the Guarantee
Where the guarantee for repairs, although absolute, is for a short
period only, the chances are that it will be upheld as a guarantee of work-
manship only.5 4 One court has upheld a contract containing an eight year
guarantee, on the grounds that the period of guarantee was no longer than
the ordinary durability of the pavement when laid with the best work-
manship.5
The more recent decisions have shown a definite tendency to validate
the contract where possible, and a disposition on the part of the courts to
allow greater discretion on the part of municipal authorities in their deal-
ings with contractors.5
SUMMARY
The power of the legislature to assess or authorize assessment for the
original construction of a local improvement is nowhere questioned. In
5o. Fehler v. Gosnell, 99 Ky. 380, 35 S. W. 1125 (1898).
51. Philadelphia v. Pemberton, 2o8 Pa. 214, 57 Atl. 516 (19o4). See also Martin
v. Sullivan, 29 Ky. L. R. 943, 96 S. W. 807 (i9o6).
52. Siegfried Construction Co. v. New York, 126 Misc. 689, 214 N. Y. Supp. 385
(Sup. Ct. 1926).
53. Brown v. Jenks, 98 Cal. 10, 32 Pac. 7Ol (893) ; Portland v. Bituminous Pav-
ing Co., 33 Ore. 3o7, 52 Pac. 28 (1898).
54. Pease v. Payette, 26 Idaho 793, 147 Pac. 29o (1915) ; Covington v. Dressment,
6 Bush. 21o (Ky. 1869) ; Louisville v. Henderson, 5 Bush. 515 (Ky. 1869).
55. People ex rel. North v. Featherstoneaugh, 172 N. Y. 112, 64 N. E. 8o2 (19o2).
56. Hodges v. Roswell, 31 N. M. 384, 247 Pac. 310 (1926); Siegfried Construc-
tion Co. v. New York, 126 Misc. 689, 214 N. Y. Supp. 385 (Sup. Ct. 1926).
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Pennsylvania alone, however, there may be no assessment for work of any
kind done in betterment of an improvement after it has been once con-
structed. An uncertain number of jurisdictions, but certainly Illinois and
Massachusetts, deny the constitutionality of an assessment for repairs to an
improvement. However, even where the power to assess for repairs is
not contrary to fundamental law, it is seldom exerted. But in many
instances, somewhat the same effect as an assessment for repairs has been
obtained through the requirement of contractors' guarantees of the original
construction. The courts have tended to uphold these guarantees, thus
placing their desire to protect the public against dishonest contractors
above the possibility that an illegal burden has been placed on property
by the assessment. T.O.R.
